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The Current Economic Crisis and the Welfare State 
Peter A. Hall 
 
What is the significance of the current economic crisis for the welfare state?  Will the 
financial crisis and economic recession of 2008-2009 inspire renewed appreciation for 
the value of social safety-nets or cut-backs in spending that threaten social solidarity?  
Only time will tell, but it is not too early to make some tentative predictions. 
We should begin by recognizing that the import of the crisis is different in 
different types of political economies, and not only, as the French Finance Minister has 
said, because the welfare states of continental Europe have automatic stabilizers lacking 
in the countries Gösta Esping-Andersen described as liberal welfare states.  Stylizing 
slightly, we can distinguish two very different ‘growth models’ in the economic strategies 
of the developed democracies over the past two decades.  Especially relevant are 
differences in how they resolved two key problems, namely, the problem of ensuring 
adequate demand for their products and the problem of mobilizing political consent for 
the neo-liberal policies that all have pursued to one degree or another over the past two 
decades.  The latter is a serious problem because neo-liberal policies tend to increase 
wage inequality, and so cannot be presented as a ‘class compromise’ because they deliver 
more obvious benefits to people on one side of the class divide than to those on the other. 
Over the last twenty years, several liberal market economies, such as the U.S. and 
the U.K., have embraced models in which economic growth is led by consumer demand.  
But this is not easy to accomplish when median and below-median incomes are 
stagnating, as they have been for more than a decade in the United States.  Thus, as 
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Raghuram Rajan has observed, the indispensible complement has been financial 
regulations that offered consumers cheap credit, to see them through adverse life events 
or fluctuations in the economy, and ready access to government-guaranteed mortgages 
that fed housing booms, giving many people the illusion that their wealth was increasing 
even if their real incomes were not.  These measures also mobilized consent for neo-
liberal policies that on any standard assessment would not seem to benefit ordinary 
voters.  Fueled by the cheaper credit that entry into European monetary union and 
German export surpluses provided, several southern European countries also pursued 
variants of this growth model over the past decade. 
By contrast, in these years, the continental economies of northern Europe 
developed growth models in which demand was led by exports that were made 
competitive through processes of coordinated wage bargaining and incremental 
innovation.  The varieties-of-capitalism literature explains why these political economies 
were well-suited to such strategies.  In continental Europe, political consent for neo-
liberal policies has been secured in two ways over the past twenty years.  On the one 
hand, more generous social programs were used to offset the effects of rising wage 
inequality on disposable income.  On the other hand, measures that began with the Single 
European Act of 1986 turned the European Union into an agent for market liberalization 
behind which national governments could hide. 
At first glance, we might think that the fiscal problems generated by the recent 
economic recession pose the biggest problems for the largest welfare states, such as those 
in northern Europe.  With these models as a backdrop, however, we can see that, 
paradoxically, just the reverse is the case.  The real crisis of the welfare state is likely to 
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occur in the liberal market economies, for two reasons.  First, these countries incurred 
especially high deficits in the wake of the crisis in order to revive growth based on 
longstanding models led by consumer demand, and thus serious cutbacks may be 
required there to restore fiscal balance.  Second, the dramatic reductions in lending that 
followed the financial crisis have especially severe consequences in economies where the 
well-being of ordinary people has depended so heavily on housing booms and easy 
access to credit – essentially hidden features of the Anglo-American welfare states.  
Thus, it is in the already-residual welfare states of the US and Britain that social 
protection and the well-being of the poor are likely to suffer the most in the coming 
years. 
Much the same can be said of southern Europe, although sovereign debt crises are 
forcing even more immediate and draconian spending cuts there, while the effects of the 
crisis on the welfare states of northern Europe are likely to be less substantial.  Even 
there, efforts to restore fiscal balance will eat into social benefits, but export-led growth 
should ease the pain, and, in most of these countries, ordinary people are less dependent 
on consumer lending to sustain their well-being. 
What might the long-term effects of the crisis be on political support for the 
welfare state?  At first glance, we might expect that support to rise, since the negative 
socioeconomic impact of the crisis would have been much greater were it not for the 
social safety-nets that welfare states now provide, and the failure of many market-
oriented policies that the crisis revealed might be expected to revive interest in more 
interventionist policies.  In some countries where the crisis is especially severe, that 
might happen. 
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 On the whole, however, there are several reasons to expect a more muted 
response, marked by a reluctance to increase the role of the state in the economy.  First, 
despite the examples of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Swedish social democrats often 
cited today, there is no Say’s law in politics: economic crisis does not automatically call 
forth political mobilization on the left.  History teaches us that economic downturns are 
just as likely to inspire a nativist response, characterized by increasing hostility to 
immigrants and rising support for the radical right.  Second, ordinary people do not 
simply blame markets for economic crises: they also blame governments.   Still 
influenced by a Keynesian era that is otherwise past, they hold governments responsible 
for rising unemployment.  Virtually every government in power during the deep 
recession of the 1970s was turned out of office at the next election.  Across Europe and 
America, distrust in government has been rising for more than a decade.  People want 
relief from the crisis, but they do not necessarily think that more interventionist 
governments can provide it. 
These factors go some distance toward explaining both the popularity of the Tea 
Party movement in the United States and the fact that the British electorate turned out a 
government committed to social justice in favor of one committed to fiscal austerity.  Of 
course, the political pendulum is going to swing back and forth, but it is not necessarily 
going to turn toward the political left.  Much will depend on who is currently in power 
and thus blamed for a bitter economic crisis.   
Therefore, in the long run as well as the short term, we can expect the welfare 
states of northern Europe to endure, despite some marginal adjustments, while those at 
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the margins of the labor market in Britain, the U.S., Ireland and southern Europe have 
good reason to worry whether their already-limited levels of social protection will survive 
the fall-out from this economic crisis. 
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